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Designs on Critical Practice?  
Terry E. Rosenberg  
Abstract  
This paper initially focuses on the way design and other creative  disciplines are 
compromised and reduced in their practices in order  that they may ‘fit’ within academe, 
with its axiological cast  determined by the epistemologies of the sciences and 
humanities; a  cast that has no place for the uncertainties of creative practice. It  then 
explores the epistemological bases of design thinking and  suggests that if design 
thinking is knowledge it is knowledge-in (as)-  potential (potentia). This is a knowledge 
built with uncertainties - a  pre-reflective knowing. It then moves to describe a critical 
thread  that may be drawn through the stretch of design practice, including  its 
uncertainties, and argues that this criticality is what the design  community needs to 
appreciate and develop. It finally argues that  academe needs to modify it’s validity 
criteria to accommodate critical  practice rather than shape practice to fit with current 
validation  models. 
Full Paper  
Introduction  
With the move of art and design schools into an academic  mainstream (in deference to 
Coldstream’s recommendations),  educators working in the sector were forced to 
engage with a  problematic where onto-generative activities, creative practices, were 
 required to be shaped to and laid in the (procrustean) bed of  academic practice – with 
its epistemological exigencies. With a series of knots, worthy of King Gordius, they found 
ways of tying together theory and practice in order to lay their unruly practices in the 
ruled  bed of academic practice. 
 
Educators in art and design have looked at the way practice may be  based on theory, 
informed by theory and generally engage theory in  different ways. They marshalled 
various prepositional, adverbial and  adjectival ties to help them condition the 
relationship. They have  asked that practice be led by theory, based on theory and 
informed  by theory. They have addressed research as a (or, is it ‘the’) process  of 
theory formulation and have shaped up our practices so that they  may consider the 
possibility of research through, into, for and about  practice. And, in an attempt to slice 
through the Gordian knot, they  have even advanced the idea of theory as practice (or, is 
it the other  way round?). They (or is it we; since we are all implicated) have  done this in 
order to legitimate what is essentially ontological,  possibly even a pre-ontological 
disposition, in a court of  epistemological practices. 
 
The introduction of ‘creative practices’ into academe has caused a  seismic shift in a 
number of traditional academic disciplines  (epistemological practices), who are 
beginning to look at practice–led  theory or indeed theory as (creative) practice. This 
inversion, or, reconfiguration of the theory/practice relationship, is made because  the 
traditional academic disciplines are beginning to see how practice  may move ahead of 
theory and open up views into as yet  untheorized spaces. 
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Although creative practice (design) may reference theory (and in  many cases does) and 
lead theory, creative practice is not  necessarily made better by being bound or woven 
through/into  theoretical stricture. Practice related to theoretical formulations is  often 
useful and often necessary in particular areas of practice -  theory may indeed inform 
practice and in some instances may be a  necessary part of a creative practice – ‘theory 
informed practice’ is  not a term sufficient in its scope to encompass all of either the 
 creative actions or the creative outcomes that should be promoted in  academe.  
 
Design needs to entertain and engage with an expanded notion of  what informs and 
supports creative practice and indeed in an  expanded notion of what the actual practice 
is and does. Criticality is,  consequently, a more helpful term than “theory based-led-
informed  practice” – more able to describe the full range of thinking (in-action)  that is 
used to motivate and develop practice. It is also a better  descriptive qualification of the 
actual practice itself and what it  effects. 
 
This paper will move to delineate and describe this critical creative  practice; a practice 
that moves critically in spaces between or beyond  theory so as to speculate, provoke 
and create new questions, new  understandings and, in some instances, new answers in 
a number of  problematics.   
Reneging on Uncertainty  
In Coldstream’s deal, where art and design was given the nod and  accepted into the 
academic fold, artists and designers were placed in  a situation where, wittingly or 
unwittingly, they were made to renege  on the flow of uncertainties and doubts that run 
through practice;  and, which in many ways, give course to its particular lifeblood. They 
 were, in certainty, forced to be like the academic subjects they were  joining. They were 
brought, outsiders, into an established order  where they were enjoined and brought to 
book in a court which  wished certain account – to know and to know assuredly and in a 
 particular manner. What is/was promoted in this court is knowledge  formed through 
consistent and reliable (?) methodology, producing  robust data, which when analysed 
yielding conclusions accepted and  appreciated by an academic community (or is it 
academic  communities) all involved in doing the same thing – all contributing  to the 
Western Knowledge Project.   
 
The ‘Project’ has a strict measure; boundaries are policed separating:  
 
The true or the accepted from the not true or the unaccepted or the not yet 
accepted ...[establishing]... internally a territory of the Same and externally a 
territory of the Other.1 
 
Knowledge is valid if of the Same; other types of knowing, other cultures’ knowing, are 
all proscribed - not able to meet the exacting and exact standards of Western academe. 
The heart of the Western Knowledge Project is research. The purpose of research is to 
study the world (the Other), adequate the Other so that it may be 
understandable/assayable in the court of the Same ..and evolve theory through which 
one gains knowledge and control over the Other. Literally, put the Other in his, her or its 
place:  
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The desire to explain (through research) is... a symptom of the desire to have a 
self (the researcher) that can control  knowledge and a world that can be known 
(i.e. converted to  the Same’.2  
 
This research is validated (as new knowledge) through a warrant (gained through 
repeatable and thus verifiable method) that establishes that what is advanced is a-
historically and a- geographically truthful – truthful beyond any context (not 
acknowledging that this itself is a value laden context – produced in a Western 
positivist/scientific tradition). In this pursuit of truth the ‘thing to be known’ is isolated from 
all other things - and contexts - in case it is contaminated by the uncertainties of 
everything else around it. What cannot be established as ‘truthful’ through declared, 
 trusted and rigorous method is most often gainsaid in academe. 
 
But, although, across the academic board, all fall under the shadow of the Project, the 
shadow cast is perhaps not as dark in some places as in others. The proceedings of the 
‘Court of the Same’ are more relaxed in some quarters than others; and research is not 
always necessarily a prosecution which tries to establish ‘the truth’. There are fields (I 
intentionally avoid the word ‘discipline’ as it issues from the Court of the Same) where 
academics mix and blend, from an  extensive epistemological palette and where 
different voices begin to  disassemble traditional academic knowledge constructs and 
produce  projects of different knowledge cultures, separated or combined, academic or 
non-academic. There are fields in the sciences and social sciences (the humanities have 
always been more liberated, it seems) where the whole ‘knowledge thing’ becomes 
playful production rather than assiduous action focused on stripping the world bare to 
unveil the (fundamental) truth behind it. In other words the production of knowledge has 
taken a creative turn – creativity becoming essential to theory production. Validity criteria 
are more relaxed and knowledge production is softer edged and multiform in these 
fields.  
The Problem of Creative Practice in an Academic Context  
In surprising contrast the so-called ‘creative practices’ are looking to make their edges 
harder and more defined; bending and shaping practice so that it is more academic. 
‘Creative practices’ present a different problematic, they are fundamentally different in 
nature to the practices of other academic fields - sciences and social sciences.  
 
In her essay ‘Cotton and Iron’, filmmaker, critic, and theorist Trinh Minh-ha suggests that 
we think of creative practice as a journey that unsettles our way of knowing in order to 
open us up to the, at times unsettling, and unsettled ways of being in the world. She 
eloquently writes: 
  
A creative event does not grasp, it does not take  possession, it is an excursion. 
More often than not, it  requires that one leaves the realms of the known, and 
takes  oneself there where one does not expect, is not expected to  be.3  
 
The volition of creative practice, in her, and I hasten to add, my eyes, is not to grasp the 
world so as to know it, but rather to release from grasp, so as to allow flight so that we 
may make and/or experience the world differently. As Trinh Minh-ha says, it requires one 
to ‘leave the realms of the known’. Practice is necessarily dealing with what is not-
known; it leads one to engage with the world in some way – but, I am not sure this is in 
order to know it – certainly in regard to how academia currently validates knowledge. 
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Trying to Make Practice Fit: Quixotic and Just a Little Desperate  
Does it matter that practice is not knowledge?  
 
Well, it seems it does. Academe continues to try and force practice – whole or in parts - 
into an epistemological mould. Or, alternatively, creative practitioners try and create 
academic ballast by loading practice with theoretical weight – in other words tying 
practice to knowledge forms in order to produce authority and imperium (what Deleuze 
would call potestas) so that the practice may be acceptable to academe.  
Practice Equals Epistemology? Design Knowledge  
Art and design academics, understandably and imaginatively, but somewhat quixotically, 
produce terms that suggest that practice may be ‘brought to book’ epistemologically 
(grasped). They have created terms like experiential, presentational and praxiological 
knowledge so as to confer on practice status as an epistemology. Or, they try and find 
within practice those elements which are knowable, extract them from the unruly 
unknowable bits and produce them for academia’s axiological determination (based on 
securing knowledge). 
 
For instance, in design (which is the practice that this paper is particularly focussed on) 
there are those that advance design knowledge as a unique epistemology; one that is of 
a different kind altogether than the knowledge of the sciences and the humanities. 
 
The design theorist Clive Dilnot advances that design:  
 
As a mode of knowledge is not simply a form or technique or a mode of human 
action that could be contained within existing forms of knowledge (though it is 
also both of these  things) but a different disposition towards Being than that 
 reflected by other modes of knowledge.4  
 
Dilnot proposes that ‘design’s mode of knowledge is a ‘third knowledge’. This ‘third 
knowledge’ of his is built around the notion that design is in artifice ...that is that its 
‘subject matter is artifice’;  and as artifice it is ‘mediation between ourselves and the 
objective  world’. The third knowledge, in his eyes, is therefore a knowledge:  
 
Concerning how artifice may be formed and shaped in the  interaction of things, 
persons and environments (the nature  of the designing processes which shape 
artifice); and  knowledge concerning the dialogical nature of the  interactions 
surrounding artifice; that is of the impact of the  understanding of interaction on 
the nature of interaction,  and on the subjects, contexts and environments so 
 impacted.5  
 
He goes on to try and distinguish between first, second, and this  third knowledge. 
Acknowledging that he may be accused of a  glibness that comes with over-generalizing, 
he asserts that the  sciences and humanities are essentially concerned with what is (the 
 former numbers and the latter narrates the world) and are therefore  essentially 
retrospective:   
 
Dealing with the world already made and characterized by a  fixed plane of facts, 
upon which they operate analytically  rather than praxiologically.6  
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Knowledge-about and Knowledge-through  
Dilnot writes that we need to consider both knowledge-about-design  and also 
knowledge-through-design in order to appreciate design’s  space in academe. The 
knowledge-through-design, in what it  stresses, it seems to me, is a reduced idea and 
value of practice.  Knowledge-through-design, in that it stresses knowledge formation, 
 requires those bits of practice that are not epistemological to be  excised in order to 
advance those bits that are. Where does the  speculative figure in this? I am also 
unconvinced that there is a  distinction between knowledge-about and knowledge-
through,  ultimately; in the long view the distinction does not hold fast. Dilnot  says that, 
in order to become knowledge, design practice -  knowledge-through-design - needs 
translation - an exegesis - so as  to move from mere practice to knowledge. This 
exegesis sends the  praxiological back to analysis in my view. Knowledge-through-
design  is transformed into knowledge-about-design.  Even if the explanation  is 
concerned with what is at the heart of practice... an ‘enactment  into’ (Dilnot’s term) new 
form or, indeed, even if the translation  becomes a critical evaluation of how this 
‘enactment into’... may have  been done differently, practice is made adequate to its 
explanation;  and in so doing it is pinned, labelled and fixed in a ‘plane of facts’  where it 
can be operated on analytically. 
 
In other words, Dilnot is still trying to build intellectual substance by  trying to ‘grasp’ 
design - its actions and effect in the world. In the  pass, described above he is merely 
engaged in moving the  praxiological towards analysis.  
Design Praxis  
As praxis design’s difference from other forms (of creative practice)  should be noted, it 
is constituted in its address to ordinariness and  futures. Design is disposed to bring into 
being – not only as  provocation or reflection on our world - but in order to make the 
 world or a small measure of it differently. Design’s true nature is of  the world and not of 
the abstract spaces of knowledge formation, or  even the more relaxed spaces of 
discourse. 
 
Design practice is of the quotidian and its very ordinariness means it  needs a strategic 
re-orientation to gain the extra-ordinary space of  discourse (which is inherent in other 
creative practices). Also, it is of  what is yet to be rather than of the now - designing 
cannot hang an epistemology on the certainty of the given – something already there 
 ....such as a contemporary (or past) landscape/condition - for regard,  comment or 
expression.  Its object of attention (critical) is somehow deferred – lying in the future; 
and, possessed by the uncertainties of  the future. 
 
This deferred object is thus only engaged as a prospect –  expectation, yield, and view:  
 
Design is an expectation of what is yet to happen, it is  actively engaged in a 
poiesis that yields a future, and it  should have a view - a critical purchase - on, 
current and  future practice - its spaces and objects. Design  unquestionably 
produces a future, not only in as much as  every creative act moves to an 
outcome that is only fulfilled  in a future, but, also, the outcome itself is a product 
for and  thus is part of what produces a future world. The future is  an innovation, 
a thing other to what ‘is’ presently’.7  
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The ‘prospect’ as is indicated offer us potentias (as opposed to  potestas) – i.e. what is 
drawn as potential from knowledge: an  informed speculation into futures’.    
Design’s Desideratum  
 
To some extent design has merely seen itself as adding material  features back into the 
current (or near-futured) landscape and has  not acknowledged its return to illuminate 
existing and past worlds  and their objects or more especially engage with future worlds 
 critically. It hasn’t really considered or addressed its critico-discursive  reflex. This is the 
desideratum in design practice. This is what is  causing the hysteria to configure 
definitions of design (practice) that  fix an epistemological determination for practice, 
wholly or in its  elements, or, if this is not possible, to tether it to theoretical anchors.  
 The distinction between knowledge formation (with its product of  theory) and discourse 
needs to be made. The distinction in some way  is between a volition to ‘thought’ and 
‘thinking’ as volition. Referring  back to Trinh Minh-ha this restates the idea of a divide 
that lies  between those practices that wish to grasp and those that wish to  release from 
grasp so as to allow flight. Theories act to settle and close account, i.e. to explain and 
provide structure for an  understanding of the world and its practices and provide the (or 
is it  ‘a’) case for responsible and practical action. Discourses, on the other  hand, are 
not concluded accounts, they are in a process of becoming,  and engage other 
becoming(s). 
 
Discourses provide a net on which, through which and in which one can weave practice. 
They provide a ground for creative action and those creative acts themselves can in turn 
be discursive. Theories move to an absolute position whereas discourse maintains an 
incompleteness that creates a field in which to build criticality  through practice. Theories 
obviously do figure in discursivity, back- grounding discourse/practice and acting as loci - 
reference or  provocation - in an evolving field.   
 
They are points of location in the wider spaces of discourse; for  instance, situating the 
researcher/practitioner, marking out the field  of practice and setting referential loci for 
the practice. 
 
Critico-Discursivity  
 
Design, rather than trying to frame itself as a practice that produces  knowledge or as 
one that is secured to epistemological products  (except by way of orientation), needs to 
appreciate the value of and  promote a critico-discursivity that works to inform, run 
through and  indeed be a part of what practice is produced through the practice. 
 
Design practice should/is engage/d with ‘changing the shape of the thinkable’8 both in 
order to make new forms – new artifice – but also  to shape thinking so as to engage 
with past, present and future  worlds, critically and differently. Design as a field of 
endeavour  promotes and is engaged in practice where there is an attempt to  actualise 
something other than what is already written in our history.  Practice is therefore not led 
by theory nor does it necessarily aim to  produce theory. Theory led practice produces 
what Derrida would  refer to as ‘a novelty of the same’ inventing ‘the possible from the 
 possible’. What I suggest design should aim for in its practice is what  Rajchman 
describes as ‘an architecture of ‘the impossible’, the  ‘‘altogether-other’ of our invention, 
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the surprise of what is not yet  possible in the history of the spaces in which we find 
ourselves’.9  
 
This critico-discursive practice moves in spaces in-between or beyond  theory; design as 
a critico-discursive practice is a vinculum or thread  (of criticality) that runs through the 
way we were, the way we are  and the way we want to be.  
Tentative Engagements – Knowledge?  
Creative practice moves from what is known into what isn’t known;  not-yet-known or 
not-knowable. If academia is to accommodate  practice it must accept the uncertain and 
the unknowable in practice  – the non-epistemological dimension of practice. It needs to 
engage  with the movement that is necessary in order to bring into being.  
 
It seems obvious, but it needs to re-engage with the uncertainty and  doubts that run in 
the arteries of design (creative) practice and draw  these into academic practices – or is 
it rather draw academic  practices towards these uncertainties - to build a richer practice 
both  creative (poetically?) and critical (it is on this edge that I believe it  becomes 
academic).   
 
In drawing uncertainty into academic practice one can begin to see,  in the tentative 
engagements of practice possibilities for a poetic  criticality. Practice, with its 
uncertainties offers a way of ‘engaging’  the world poetically rather than ‘knowingly’ 
(scientifically or indeed in  the epistemological models of the social sciences):  
 
Poetry is to be understood here in the extended sense of a  play of poiesis, a 
creative letting go of the drive for  possession, of the calculus of means and 
ends. It allows the  rose – in the words of the mystic Silesius – to exist without 
 why. Poetics is the carnival of possibilities.10  
 
Knowledge is transfigured from potestas - the ‘authority of  knowledge’ - to potentias - 
the potentiality of knowledge(s) - in the  poetic.  
 
If this – potentia - is knowledge, it is knowledge for ‘becoming’ –  knowledge catalysing 
the potential to produce again and differently;  making other than what is already there 
(but again I emphasise knowledge even as potentia is not the full practice - creative 
practice  is also about not knowing (as remarked on above)). 
 
Intertwined in the notion of making the world or at least a part of it  ‘other’ is the idea of 
producing for an ‘Other’. This is central to design  practice. But design engages with this 
responsibility for the  intertwining of ‘othering’ (making other – poetics) and for an ‘Other’ 
 (ethics) by evolving deontologies in a calculus that sits beyond  practice. They are 
deontologies that emerge, divorced from the  imaginative dynamic of practice. I suggest 
that these deontic  programmes need to be contested in critical discourses that emerge 
 through practice; critical discourses that emerge in an imaginary of  practice (and 
practice’s imagination) both poetic and critical. An  imagination of this kind is described 
by Kearney: 
 
[An imagination] responsive to the ethical dimension of  things would be critical. 
But it would also be poetical ...the  term [is used] ...In the broad sense of 
inventive making and  creating carried by the word poiesis.  
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He goes on to say that:    
 
The ethical imagination ...[if it is not]...to degenerate into  censorious Puritanism 
or nostalgic lamentation ...must also  give full expression to its poetical potential. 
The imagination  no matter how ethical needs to play. Indeed one might  even 
say that it needs play because it is ethical – to ensure  it is ethical in a liberating 
way, in a way which animates and  enlarges our response to the other rather 
than cloistering  us off in a dour moralism of resentment and  recrimination’.11  
 
A critical design practice would be/is both poetic and ethical. The  critical merges with 
poiesis in practice and not exclusively as a  programme running in advance or after 
practice; attempting to  formulate deontologies of practice.  
Towards a Critical Practice  
There are a number of ways to slice up critical practice so as to  understand it. Although 
perhaps in practice it is not realistic to separate in such a way, for the sake of description 
one may locate  three ‘critical engagements’ for practice. One may review the critical  in 
practice as:  
 
1.  Critical engagement (stimulus): with the world and its  discourses as active 
ground for practice.  
 
2.  Critical process: considering critical reflexes in practice and  critical reflection in 
and on practice (à la Schön).  
 
3.  Critical re-engagement (reception): delivered in the critical  programme of the 
practice (what it means and what it influences and  how it is used/consumed).  
 
One must appreciate that these slices overlap each other in practice.  
Critical Engagement (stimulus): Creative Practices Landscape 
 (‘potentia’)  
In the first instance one needs to look at the way designers, as  creative practitioners, 
engage – need to know - the world, in and for  practice. This involves in the first instance 
a critical engagement with  the situatedness of the practitioner and the situation of the 
practice  and, then an engagement with the wider references and influences  that the 
practitioner draws on – theories, discourses generally and  praxis itself (creative and 
everyday). This becomes what a colleague  of mine, Suhail Malik, calls the ‘critically 
active resource’.  
 
A creative practitioner will drop epistemolog(y)(ies) back into the  world and fashion a 
landscape of what Serres and Latour call  ‘tentative knowledge’ – as an active resource 
for practice. The  epistemology is not dropped back to see if there is a fit between the 
 account (epistemology) and the world but to prepare the ‘excursion’.  Latour describes 
this procedure in a discussion of actor network theory:  
 
This solution becomes common sense once it is accepted  that an account or an 
explication or a proof is always added  to the world. Reflexivists as well as their 
pre-relativist  enemies dream of abstracting knowledge from things in 
 8
Goldsmiths Research Online (2007) 
Originally published in Reflections on Creativity: Exploring the Role of Theory in Creative 
Practices, Duncan of Jordanstone College, 2007, ISBN 1 899 837 56 6  
 themselves. ANT [actor network theory] keeps adding  things to the world and its 
selection principle is no longer  whether there is a fit between account and reality 
– this dual illusion has been dissolved away – but whether one  travels.12  
 
The travel itinerary is determined to see how best to illuminate, and,  in the case of 
design, to add material features back into the  landscape –sensitive to meaning and 
effect.   
Critical Process: Critical Reflection and Critical Speculation  
In much of the literature on the critical in process, the process is  described with 
particular emphasis given to a critical knowing for, in  and of practice. The work of Schön 
particularly is much referred to in  this regard. The critical in the work of Schön works in 
line with what  is known, what is thought. 
 
I grant that design practice, design thinking, is tethered to thought  (reflection), but, it is 
also thinking into the unknown (as I have  stated throughout this paper).    
 
For Heidegger thinking, all thinking, is thinking into what withdraws  into a speculative 
space. Heidegger suggests that one is caught in  the draft of this speculative thinking 
and that one’s being is  fashioned through the orientation of this draft in which one is 
caught:  
 
We are who we are by pointing in that direction – not like  an incidental adjunct 
but as follows: this “being in the draft  of” is in itself an essential and therefore 
constant pointing  toward what withdraws. To say “being in the draft of” is to  say 
“pointing toward what withdraw”.13  
 
But thinking for him is also at the same time thinking towards what  we are inclined to; 
and what we are inclined to is what ‘in turn  inclines towards us by appealing to our 
essential being as what holds  us there’. For Heidegger thinking is not only thinking into 
a draft into  what hasn’t yet been thought (speculation – prospect(ing)) but is  also 
fashioned in thinking back, in poesy:   
 
Poesy is the water that at times flows backwards to the  source, toward thinking 
as a thinking back, a recollection.14  
 
So what Heidegger hands us in terms of thinking are two actions:  thinking back to what 
we know and what holds, and, forwards into a  not yet known space. Into this doubling of 
thinking he writes making  – organising and communicating as a way of bringing it 
together. He  develops the idea of thinking as a handicraft (wroughting) and then  moves 
this to a consideration of the craft of the hand:  
 
The craft of the hand is richer than we commonly imagine.  The hand does not 
only grasp and catch or push or pull. The  hand reaches and extends, receives 
and welcomes – and  not just things: the hand extends itself and receives its own 
 welcome in the hand of others. The hand holds. The hand  carries. The hand 
designs and signs, presumably because  man is a sign.15  
 
The hand is used to point, to sign, to sign-ify. What is drawn by  Heidegger in this 
pointing hand is a critical thread between what  holds (what is) and what 
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withdraws and draws us into the ‘draft’ of  what is not yet known (what is not 
yet).16  
 
This Heidegerrian thinking is a haunting description of design. Following this idea of 
thinking as at the same time compulsion to the  known and impulsion to the unknown we 
need to think of design as  being developed through a critical process that is composed 
of critical  reflection but in tandem with critical speculation. 
Critical Re-engagement (reception): Illumination  (discursivity)  
Design (any creative practice) may work back into the landscape  critically and creatively 
(poetically) to illuminate and refigure its  material objects and spaces.  This ‘illumination’ 
through a critico-  discursive return is not the chiaroscuro lighting of Enlightenment 
 epistemic practice, where the epistemic landscape was lit in a hard  directional light (to 
shed light on), producing:   
 
Clear and distinct knowledge, scientific unity, [and] the  triumph of reason...by 
assuming ‘a transparent space in  which a single law reigned, that of light or the 
sun’s power:  nothing new under the sun.17  
 
In this en-lightened landscape descended from Enlightenment  thinking, the landscape is 
set out through a ‘tyranny of the given’;  the topography is consistent, and nothing moves 
or alters, all is held  still for an epistemological grasp.  
 
But if we are engaged in onto-generative practice we need to  appreciate the movement 
and changes in the landscape and engage  with shifting ground and other features, and 
also shifting light. The  landscape is ‘in becoming’. Quoting Serres again, this is:  
 
A fairly soft and filtered light that allows us better to see  things in relief, through 
the effect of contrast produced by  rays and shadows that melt together, that are 
mixed,  nuanced ...This is the way we see ordinarily, really, daily –  with our 
bodily eyes in concrete surroundings.18  
 
The way practice returns as critico-discursive is again to enter the  landscape and 
contribute lumens to the soft, filtered light in order to  illuminate in movement a world in 
movement. The critical discourse  ‘...unfolds by way of mediation, transformation and 
circulation’. The  discourse itself is in movement.  
 
The way the critico-discursive part of practice enlightens is through  ‘scintillation’ 
– a term Serres uses – which illuminates the ‘fragile  synthesis’ of the ‘very tissue 
in which objects, things themselves are immersed – the all encompassing and 
diabolically complex network  of inter-information’.19  
 
Academics, design practitioners and theorists, all, need to appreciate  this programme in 
design; a programme where through practice  design evolves its critico-discursive 
dimension. And, most  importantly, they also need to explore and evolve contexts for its 
–  critical practices’ – reception, academic and otherwise. The need for  this space for 
the critico-discursive potential of design practice is not  yet appreciated and needs to be 
acknowledged in the expectations  and determination of academe and indeed in the 
design community  in general. 
 10
Goldsmiths Research Online (2007) 
Originally published in Reflections on Creativity: Exploring the Role of Theory in Creative 
Practices, Duncan of Jordanstone College, 2007, ISBN 1 899 837 56 6  
In Conclusion: Resisting Procrustes  
In a similar way to Procrustes,20 design continuously offers up the  corpus of its activity 
and its objects to the particular geometrical bed  of academia’s (current) validating 
framework (of and for academic  research). The ‘one size fits all’ bed of Procrustes is 
echoed in the  criteria for research formulated by academia; manifest in the  standards of 
those institutions to which it gives account and who control the account of its activities (in 
England, HEFCE, RAE, AHRC  and others). I acknowledge that academics, including 
those engaged  in creative practice, establish and are involved in these institutions  and 
are therefore responsible not only to, but also, for them, so theoretically are able to form 
and change them. But, they do not  and, ironically, to some extent, feel they cannot. The 
academic  design community is deferential; bound in a calculus of habits so  deeply 
encysted in the way they define and do things so as to seem  natural. These encysted 
habits, regularities (Foucault), mask the ideologies that shape them (‘myths’ in Roland 
Barthes’ semiotics).  These invisible ideologies (myths) - set the determining shape and 
 size of the procrustean bed; marking out the boundaries that include  or exclude the 
corpus or bits of it that are offered up to it.  
 
I contend that in an academic milieu the problem of the acceptance  of creative actions 
(practice) and outcomes is figured the wrong way  round. Those working in academia in 
areas of creative practice  regularly ask how they may make what they do fit a cruel 
 procrustean bed. Academia has failed to place under review the way  it validates 
creative practices as research, or indeed as academic  activity at all. Rather, than review 
validity criteria, academia forces  academics in creative disciplines to try to configure 
what they do to  fit rather limiting frames that validate what is considered and  accepted 
as academic. These academics can, and currently do, work  around and with practice 
stretching it and cutting it in order that it  may fit the procrustean bed; but in so doing 
they risk losing (have  lost) the life-blood of the practice and its objects. In particular they 
 are forced to bracket and remainder any thinking that is fuelled by  doubt and 
uncertainty; experimental and speculative thinking, the  very essences of creative 
practice, are set to one side in this offering  up to validation.  
 
There is clearly a need for ‘new imaginaries of validity’21 that not only  reconstruct 
‘validity’ or ‘truth’ as many sided, multiply perspectival,  as shifting and complex’,22 
accommodating ‘other’ epistemologies  (‘other’ cultures of knowledge) but ones that are 
also expansive  enough to celebrate the experimental and the uncertain; valuing and 
 validating that which is not necessarily epistemological.  
 
These ‘new imaginaries of validity’ need to be evolved with regard for  the ‘logic of 
sense’23 of creative practice/thinking; a logic that stands  in opposition to the notion of 
'sentential truths' – of certainties -  which currently tightly hold the activities of academia. 
Instead of  validity criteria that need and warrant ‘certainties’ and ‘truths’  academia 
needs to evolve criteria where the provisional, hypothetical  and speculative are 
considered and valued aesthetically; validating  that which is not yet graspable (not yet 
theorized) or ultimately  ungraspable (not theorisable).   
 
I believe that Bachelard's idea of validating work according to its  resonance, 
reverberation and repercussion24 may mark a starting  point for evolving these new 
validity criteria.  
 
 11
Goldsmiths Research Online (2007) 
Originally published in Reflections on Creativity: Exploring the Role of Theory in Creative 
Practices, Duncan of Jordanstone College, 2007, ISBN 1 899 837 56 6  
Resonance: causing reinforcement or prolongation of sound... critical reflection (intrinsic 
validity) (deconstruction).  
 
Reverberation: to have a respondent effect on – return or re-echoing in the world... 
critical reception (extrinsic validity) (semiosis - reception).  
 
Repercussion: to impinge on an advancing body ...critical effect (systemic validity) 
(concomitance). It may also be worth considering other praxis sensitive ideas of  validity 
including catalytic and constructive validity. Lather's transgressive validity25 criteria - 
voluptuous, ironic, rhizomatic and  paralogic - may also provide criteria that are sensitive 
to the ‘logic of  sense’ of creative practice and its objects.  
 
Lather’s transgressive validity: ironic, paralogic, rhizomatic and  voluptuous create loci 
through which one may:  
 
• value multiple representations  • encourage critical reflection (deconstruction)  • 
abolish the need for an appeal to an Authority outside the work   • encourage 
resistance to linearity, closure and resolution  • license complexity  • resist the 
arrogation of the ‘Other’ to the ‘Same’  • value combinatory thinking, (multiple and 
fecund)  
 
In summation, I believe it behoves academia to evolve validity  criteria adequate to 
creative practice (and not adequate practice to  validity criteria, as one does currently); it 
is imperative that the  academic community (particularly that of design) re-consider its 
 measures of academic worth so as to make space for the fullness of  its practices. It is 
important for academia and for the creative  practices to evolve a space (actual and 
metaphorical) where critical  practice may have course and be held in regard by 
academia. This is not before time. 
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